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The primary goals of the U.S. 
pension system are to provide secure 
and adequate retirement income and to 
cover all or most workers. In each of 
these respects, the system needs better 
solutions. With the decline in defi ned 
benefi t (DB) plans and the increasing 
reliance on 401(k) plans, future retirees 
will have less secure and less adequate 
retirement income than current retirees.
These issues are addressed in the book 
Pension Policy: The Search for Better 
Solutions, which was recently published 
by the Upjohn Institute (see p. 7). This 
article summarizes the main policy 
recommendations from the book.
Policy Recommendations for 
401(k) Plans
Since the 1980s, the role of 401(k) 
plans has changed from being mainly 
supplementary, offered by employers who 
also offer a DB plan, to often being the 
only plan employers provide. However, 
401(k) plan regulation has lagged in 
recognizing its increasingly important 
role. 
The regulation of 401(k) plans should 
be changed so that two types of plans 
would be recognized. First, 401(k) 
retirement plans would be the primary or 
sole plan provided by an employer and 
would be regulated as retirement plans 
rather than savings plans. The goal here 
is to close the regulatory gap between 
DB plans and 401(k) plans. For example, 
the 401(k) retirement plan would be 
required to offer an annuity as the default 
payout option, with spousal consent 
for not taking a joint and survivor’s 
annuity, similar to the spousal protections 
provided by DB plans.
The second type, a 401(k) savings 
plan, would be offered by employers that 
also offer DB plans meeting minimum 
standards as to generosity. These plans 
would continue to be regulated as they 
currently are, refl ecting their historical 
roots as secondary plans that supplement 
DB plans. Having this two-tier regulation 
of 401(k) plans could encourage 
employers to offer DB plans because it 
would permit them to offer 401(k) plans 
meeting less rigorous standards.
Participants in 401(k) plans often 
unknowingly bear the plan’s investment 
costs and typically also the administrative 
costs. The fees they pay (in dollars), as 
well as the expense ratio for investment 
expenses, should be disclosed on annual 
and quarterly account statements. This 
type of disclosure is done in Australia 
for administrative fees and by the Janus 
mutual funds for investment costs.
While the focus of much pension 
research is on inertia by pension 
participants, a seldom discussed 
problem with the coverage provided by 
defi ned contribution plans is the lack of 
persistency of contributions by many 
workers. The lack of persistency explains 
in part the surprisingly low account 
balances that many 401(k) participants 
have. Policy has not been developed to 
address this problem.
Policy Recommendations for Defi ned 
Benefi t Plans
Some analysts consider the decline 
in DB plans as an inevitable outcome 
because those plans are unable to 
adapt to a changing economic and 
demographic environment. A number of 
policies could be considered, however, 
based on the view that their endangered 
status is due in part to their regulatory 
environment.  
Private sector DB plans are the 
only major type of pension plan in 
the United States that does not permit 
employee tax deductible contributions. 
Those contributions are permitted for 
401(k) and DB plans for state and local 
government employees. Extending tax 
deductibility to private sector DB plan 
participants would help level the playing 
fi eld between DB and 401(k) plans. 
The increase in life expectancy 
appears to have contributed to the decline 
in DB plans, because DB plans are not 
fl exibile enough to deal readily with 
this continued rise in cost. In the United 
States, some plans have reduced their 
generosity, but generally this change is 
only done for new hires and thus has 
limited effect on the plan sponsor’s costs. 
Life expectancy risk can be divided 
into the idiosyncratic risk that a particular 
individual will live longer than expected 
and the cohort risk that an entire cohort 
on average will live longer than expected. 
Annuity providers are able to manage 
idiosyncratic risk by pooling it across 
large numbers of people, effectively 
diversifying it away. However, cohort 
risk cannot be pooled because it is 
correlated across participants. Life 
expectancy indexing of benefi ts is one 
way of dealing with this risk. With 
that approach, cohort risk is borne by 
workers, who are the benefi ciaries of the 
improved life expectancy and thus are 
best able to bear the risk.
A policy innovation, following the 
Notional Defi ned Contribution plan 
in Sweden, would be to permit life 
expectancy indexing of benefi ts at 
retirement. For each new retirement 
cohort, the generosity of the plan would 
be adjusted downward to refl ect the trend 
toward greater life expectancy. Under 
current U.S. law, this innovation would 
be prohibited because it would violate 
the anticutback rule, which is defi ned 
in terms of annual benefi ts. If that rule 
were redefi ned to take an economist’s 
perspective and use lifetime benefi ts as 
the measure, life expectancy indexing 
would not constitute a cutback in lifetime 
benefi ts. 
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With the decline in defi ned 
benefi t plans, future retirees 
will have less secure retirement 
income than current retirees.
The role of 401(k) plans has 
changed from being mainly 
supplementary to often being 
the only plan employers provide.
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The tax system could be used to 
encourage broader coverage through DB 
plans. For example, to tie the interests 
of management to those of workers, the 
allowable maximum income considered 
for determining DB plan benefi ts could 
be raised in plans that provide coverage 
to all full-time workers. Another option 
could require employers that provide a 
DB plan for management to also provide 
a similar plan for employees.
Workers in DB plans who are laid 
off suffer losses on the benefi ts they 
have already accrued. Their benefi ts 
are frozen in nominal terms at layoff, 
and the real value of those benefi ts is 
eroded by infl ation between that point 
and the point at which they qualify for 
retirement benefi ts. DB plans can make 
these workers wait until age 65 to receive 
benefi ts. For laid-off workers, the loss of 
pension benefi ts can be more serious than 
the loss of wages, while for employers 
the loss of pension benefi ts gives them a 
bonus for laying off workers. 
One policy option is to require 
fi rms that lay off workers in corporate 
restructuring to price index the benefi ts 
of those workers until retirement. This 
obligation in a certain sense would not 
impose a new cost on employers, it just 
would mandate that they pay the benefi ts 
to these workers that they had promised 
to pay assuming continued employment. 
Funding rules prohibit employers 
from contributing to DB plans in years 
that funding exceeds a certain level. 
This requirement of zero contributions 
generally occurs when the stock market 
and companies are performing well. 
Because pension plans are long-term 
commitments, and because of the 
fl uctuations in the stock market, at a later 
date plan sponsors then generally are 
required to contribute. This requirement 
generally occurs when the stock market 
and companies are performing poorly. 
The temporal pattern of contributions 
not only increases the volatility of 
contributions, it forces plan sponsors to 
contribute on a schedule that is exactly 
opposite to what they would choose. 
To reduce the volatility and timing 
problem of employer contributions 
for DB plan funding, the maximum 
contribution requirements can be eased. 
For example, plans could be allowed 
to contribute 25 percent of the normal 
cost any year, regardless of the level of 
funding, thus allowing plan sponsors 
to contribute every year. This is the 
desired pattern for pension plans, which 
are ongoing entities that are accruing 
liabilities every year.
Losing track of pensions is a problem 
for workers who are laid off or who 
change jobs. It can be diffi cult for a 
worker to fi nd a pension from a former 
employer, particularly if that employer 
has gone out of business. Both the United 
Kingdom and Australia have gone further 
than the United States in assisting people 
The fees that participants 
pay (in dollars), as well as the 
expense ratio for investment 
expenses, should be disclosed 
on annual and quarterly 
account statements.
facing this problem. A national registry, 
perhaps as an expansion of the registry 
maintained by the Pension Benefi t 
Guaranty Corporation, would be an 
improvement in this area.
Conclusions
Pension policy is an evolving 
product of social institutions and the 
economy. With the decline in DB plans 
and the increasing role of 401(k) plans, 
improvement is needed in the way 
pensions are provided to U.S. workers. 
The regulation of 401(k) plans needs 
to be updated to recognize that they 
generally are no longer supplementary 
plans. Policies need to be enacted to 
strengthen DB plans by making them 
more fl exible and improving the ways 
they are funded.
John A. Turner is the director of the 
Pension Policy Center.
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